

# THE GENERAL STAFFS OF CERTAIN BELLIGERENT POWERS

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PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF CORPS  
AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY  
POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

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## I. INTRODUCTION.

The object of this study is to give a concise account of the general staffs of certain belligerent powers taking part in the present European war, showing their personnel and duties under peace conditions, and also any increases or changes that have been made necessary during the progress of the present war, so far as data are at present available.

It is proposed to supplement this paper with full information as to any further changes in general staff organizations resulting from the experiences of the present war, when the necessary data have been supplied.

### 1. THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ARMY.

The work of the general staff of this army, 1911, included: (1) Service in the offices of the general staff; (2) with troops; (3) in special scientific military employment; and (4) for missions abroad.

"The chief of the general staff for all the armed forces" was the head of the general staff, and was under the immediate orders of the Emperor, and was also an auxiliary organ of the war minister. All work relating to operations and to preparation for the employment of the entire armed force in war was incumbent upon him. He kept in touch with the commander of the navy regarding operations of the fleet. He was assisted in his work by the "deputy chief of the general staff."

The general staff worked in seven sections.

The first section transacted personal and economic affairs and did the correspondence between the sections of the general staff and with outside quarters.

The section for operations worked at all operative affairs, the measures in connection with mobilization, plans for strategic movements, opinions and proposals regarding fortifications, organization and training of the army, regulations and instructions of a tactical and operative nature, programs for maneuvers and matters connected therewith.

The section of instruction attended to the instruction and training of general staff officers.

The topographical section was employed in the military geographical description of the monarchy and other countries.

The intelligence section collected and recorded data concerning foreign armies and fortifications.

The railway section attended to all railway and steamship matters.

The telegraph section attended to the telegraph and signal service.

The general staff attended to the war school, the Military Geographical Institute, and the war archives.

The general staff officers serving with troops performed duties corresponding to the combined duties of chiefs of staff and adjutants general in the United States Army.

The normal strength of the general staff in time of peace, 1911, was:

One general, chief of staff; 2 lieutenant field marshals—one the deputy chief of staff, the other the chief of the military geographical institute; 2 major generals—one chief of the war archives and the other the chief of the war school; 41 colonels, 77 lieutenant colonels, 85 majors, and 209 captains; total, 417. After completing studies at the war school 209 additional officers were attached to the general staff for duty and try out, with a view to their possible appointment on the general staff. In addition there were 46 other officers for clerical work on the general staff, but not with a view to being appointed members of the general staff. Total performing general-staff work, 672.

In time of war the chief of staff takes full control of military matters. According to information on file in the War College, 1914, the Austrian general staff was as follows:

One chief of staff, 1 adjutant to the chief of staff, 2 assistant chiefs of staff—one in charge of lines of communication. The part of the general staff corresponding to our War Department General Staff was divided into eight bureaus: Bureau of direction, bureau of operations, bureau of communication and supplies, bureau of instructions, bureau of monographs, bureau of evidence, bureau of transportation, bureau of telegraphy, and was charged also with the war college, war archives, and military geographical institute. The number of general-staff officers allowed by law was 508; 249 officers were assigned and 71 attached to the general staff; and 101 line officers were detailed on general-staff work, making a total of 929 officers performing general-staff work.

## 2. THE GENERAL STAFF OF FRANCE.

The general staff of the French Army is one of the seven main divisions of the war department. Military matters, unless they concern more than one department of the National Government, are

directed by the superior military council, which consists of the minister of war, the chief of staff, and 10 major generals. The superior military council exercises control over the general staff. One of the major generals of the superior military council is assistant chief of staff; others are assigned in time of peace to command armies in time of war, and have with them the three general-staff officers to be on their staffs in the field. These prospective army commanders have, in time of peace, supervision of the troops that would be under their command in war. They prepare and direct the maneuvers and staff rides for the training of these troops and generally see to their preparation for war. They are army inspectors.

The chief of staff is the head of the war department general staff, and deals with the larger questions. Other general-staff matters are under the assistant chief of staff. The work of the war department general staff is performed by three groups, each under a general officer.

#### FIRST GROUP.

1. The bureau of military operations and general training of the army.
2. The bureau charged with the study of the organization and tactics of foreign armies.
3. The bureau of railways and lines of communication.

#### SECOND GROUP.

1. Bureau of organization and mobilization of the army.
2. The African section.
3. The historical section.

#### THIRD GROUP.

1. The section of the personnel of the general staff.
2. Routine service section of the general staff.
3. The administrative section.

The chief of staff, assistant chief of staff, and the chief of the first group are major generals. The chiefs of the second and third groups are brigadier generals. In addition the following general staff officers were authorized by law before the present war: Thirty colonels, 40 lieutenant colonels, 170 majors, and 400 captains; total 640.

General staff officers were assigned as follows: War Department general staff, 132; staff with troops, 480; additional staff officers with the war department general staff, 47; with troops, 216. The general staff is larger now.



### 3. THE GENERAL STAFF OF GERMANY.

The general staff of Germany consists of the war department general staff (called the great general staff) and the general staff officers on duty with the troops.

The officers of the war department general staff performed, in peace, the following duties:

One general, chief of staff, directly under the Emperor, and has charge of the war academy and the land survey; 1 lieutenant general, assistant chief of staff, chief of division; 4 major generals, heads of four divisions; 11 colonels, chiefs of sections; 6 lieutenant colonels, four of them are chiefs of sections; 37 majors, duty with sections and committees; 52 captains and 1 lieutenant performing various general staff duties; total 113.

This part of the general staff is organized into 9 sections and the historical and geographical departments. It has complete charge of the mapping of the country and of the maps of Germany and other countries.

The general staff officers on duty with the troops are under the orders of their commanders, but special work may be assigned to them by the chief of staff.

Before the present war the general staff of Germany consisted of 1 general, 2 lieutenant generals, 6 major generals, 23 colonels, 21 lieutenant colonels, 116 majors, 139 captains, and 1 lieutenant, total 309. Additional officers performing general staff duties were: Three colonels, 13 lieutenant colonels, 44 majors, 36 captains, and 132 lieutenants; total attached officers 228, total number of officers performing general staff duties 537.

### 4. THE GENERAL STAFF OF GREAT BRITAIN.

The general staff at the war office has the following duties: To advise on the strategical distribution of the army; to supervise the education of the officers and the training and preparation of the army for war; to study military plans for offense and defense; to collect military information, and to direct the general policy in army matters.

The general staff with troops has the following duties: To assist the officers on whose staffs they serve in promoting military efficiency, and to aid them in carrying out the general policy in army matters.

The general staff at the war office, known as department of chief of general staff at army headquarters, was divided into three branches: Military operations, staff duties, and military training. A major general was in charge of each. General staff officers in this



department: Three major generals, 6 colonels, 21 lieutenant colonels and majors, and 27 captains. Total, 57.

The general staff officers with troops were: One major general, 6 brigadier generals, 16 colonels, 54 lieutenant colonels and majors, 12 captains, and 25 brigade majors. Total, 114.

Besides the 171 general staff officers other officers were attached to the general staff to perform general-staff duties.

Great Britain was short of officers, and the general staff was somewhat depleted at the beginning of the present war. The British press has attributed grave errors of the war to this lack of an adequate general staff. Influential Englishmen are advocating a general staff on the German plan.

### 5. THE GENERAL STAFF OF ITALY.

The latest information found at the war college shows the chief of the general staff of Italy was intrusted with the preparation, in time of peace, and execution, in time of war, of all military operations, but under the minister of war; and that the general staff consisted of 260 officers.

The war department general staff, called the great general staff, consisted of three sections: The central section, the section for military operations, and the section for railways and communications. The central section supervised the work of the others. The section for military operations was divided into five subsections, and the section for railways and communications was divided into three subsections.

The general staff officers on duty with troops performed duties that are performed in the United States by General Staff officers and by adjutants general.

### 6. THE GENERAL STAFF OF JAPAN.

The general staff has charge of the national defense and the employment of the military forces of the Empire. The chief of staff is directly under the Emperor and assists in the business of the imperial personal staff. All things relating to national defense and strategy are in his province. Furthermore, he has under his supervision all staff officers of the army and their training. Directly under his jurisdiction are: (1) General staff headquarters; (2) the land survey department; (3) the army staff college; and (4) the military attachés at embassies and legations.

A vice chief of staff assists the chief and supervises the business of general staff headquarters.

The subjects dealt with by the general staff are:

1. Defense of the Empire and plans of mobilization.
2. Statistics of foreign armies.
3. Communications and transportation of troops.
4. Geodesy and topography.
5. Historical work.

The work of the war department general staff, designated the great general staff, is performed in 5 divisions divided into 10 sections. One of the divisions is designated "general affairs"; the others are numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4. The chief of staff is a general; the vice chief of staff, a lieutenant general; the chief of each division is a major general, and the chief of each section is a colonel.

The general staff office at Tokyo consists of 1 general, 1 lieutenant general, 5 major generals, 10 colonels, 8 lieutenant colonels, 21 majors, and 33 captains. Total, 79. In connection with these are 72 other officers, making a total of 151 officers performing war department general staff duties May 1, 1915. They were assisted by 44 warrant and noncommissioned officers and 5 civilians. Under the chief of staff, the land survey department consists of 35 officers, 161 warrant and noncommissioned officers, and 135 civilians; the army staff college consists of 58 officers, 15 warrant and noncommissioned officers, and 14 civilians.

The exact number of general staff officers serving with troops in the Japanese Army is not stated in the reports received at the War College. It is understood that the strength, organization, and duties of the Japanese general staff are about the same as in other good, modern armies. The organization of the Japanese general staff is not fixed by law. It depends on the orders of the Emperor and usually changes slightly from year to year.

## 7. THE GENERAL STAFF OF RUSSIA.

The latest figures on this organization, found at the War College, show the general staff of Russia consisted of 734 officers. The general staff of that country was organized on modern lines in 1906. The chief of the general staff was part of the war ministry. In 1914 the headquarters directorate of the general staff consisted of the following six branches:

The quartermaster general's branch, consisting of seven sections; organization and administrative branch, seven sections and two sub-sections; mobilization branch, four sections; military communications branch, eight sections; topographical branch, three sections; aviation branch, two sections.

The Russian Army, like other modern armies, has general staff officers serving with troops.

## 8. THE GENERAL STAFF OF SERBIA.

In Serbia the general staff is included in the ministry of war. Part of the general staff officers serve with troops, as in the United States. The chief of staff and the assistant chief of staff had headquarters at Belgrade. The general staff is divided into three sections: (1) The operative section, divided in three parts, (*a*) personnel and matériel on campaign, (*b*) intelligence, (*c*) communications; (2) historical section, including (*a*) archives, (*b*) library; (3) geographical section, which includes four subsections, (*a*) trigonometrical, (*b*) topographical, (*c*) supplies, (*d*) mapping.

## II. CONCLUSION.

In regard to our own General Staff, the act of Congress approved February 14, 1903, creating it established its status and duties on lines entirely in accord with the approved practice in European armies, and, so far as known, the experiences of the present war have proved the soundness of this action.

Actual experience, however, has shown conclusively that the personnel originally provided for our General Staff was too limited for the comprehensive duties required of it, even for our small Army. A further bar to progress was imposed by the act of Congress approved August 24, 1912, whereby the already meager personnel was reduced by one general officer and eight captains. Under the present law it consists of 2 general officers, one of whom is Chief of Staff, 4 colonels, 6 lieutenant colonels, 12 majors, and 12 captains (or first lieutenants); total, 36. In addition, the Chief of Coast Artillery and the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs are also members of the General Staff, *ex officio*. The permanent station of these latter officers is in Washington, but the specific duties for which their offices were created to perform occupy their full attention and, properly speaking, are not duties pertaining to the General Staff any more than are those of the Chief of Engineers, Chief Signal Officer, or other bureau chiefs. As a matter of fact, they only do General Staff work when temporarily acting for the Chief of Staff and his senior assistant during the absence of those officers, and this duty is in addition to their normal functions.

At the present time the War Department General Staff consists of 2 general officers, 2 colonels, 5 lieutenant colonels, 9 majors, and 11 captains, total 29, leaving for service with troops 2 colonels, 1 lieutenant colonel, 3 majors, and 1 captain, total 7.

Because of this insufficient personnel the General Staff has been unable to undertake some of its most important functions. For example, no historical section can be established, and until this is done

the scientific military history of our various wars can not be written. Our lack of a definite military policy was largely due to the fact that we are without such histories and have consequently not learned the lessons to be derived from our own experience in war.

We can not utilize to its full extent the important information gathered abroad, because we can not assign officers to the exclusive duty of reading and digesting these reports, due to the requirements of the daily routine General Staff work pertaining to the Army, which must be first attended to.

For the same reasons we can not properly attend to the work of preparing monographs and maps pertaining to foreign countries, matters which should be always kept up to date.

One thing which prevents even our meager General Staff from rendering such efficient service as it might is the continual change of status of General Staff officers before the full detail of four years has expired. This is partly due to the fact that the present law does not provide for the retention of officers who are promoted. This defect could be remedied by providing that an officer promoted should serve out the balance of his detail in the next higher grade, the vacancy in the grade from which he was promoted not being filled until the completion of his term. This would not change the total number of officers on the General Staff detail and would greatly benefit the service by permitting continuity of work by men thoroughly trained to it.

A careful consideration of this matter shows that our War Department General Staff should consist of 94 officers of all grades, and that at the present time there should be available for service with troops not less than 27. This has been shown in detail in special studies (WCD 639-103, Nov. 15, 1915, "Reorganization of the General Staff," and WCD 9054-5, Jan. 3, 1916, "Report on the Chamberlain bill in connection with number of General Staff officers").



# FORTIFICATIONS

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# SYNOPSIS.

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## FORTIFICATIONS.

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### I. INTRODUCTION.

In a memorandum from the Chief of Staff dated November 15, 1915, directions were given for the preparation of a brochure upon the subject of "Fortifications," with sole reference to the present European war, giving especial attention to the following points:

(a) What influence forts and fortified cities, as distinguished from intrenched areas, have exerted on the operations on land.

(b) Influence of seacoast fortifications with particular reference to the attack of the allied fleet against the fortifications of the Dardanelles. Give in detail the total armament, with calibers of arms of the fleet as well as of the land forts, and the losses in personnel and material suffered by both fleets and forts.

(c) A brief summary of the attempt to take these forts by the operation of the mobile troops; the number of mobile troops, as near as can be determined, used to date, both in the attack and in the defense, with total losses.

This has been done as far as practicable with the data now available, and the results are noted in the following paragraphs:

#### 1. INFLUENCE OF FORTS AND FORTIFIED CITIES, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM INTRENCHED AREAS, UPON OPERATIONS ON LAND.

##### FORTIFICATIONS OF LIEGE.

At the outbreak of the present European war the Germans, in their march through Belgium, were, on the evening of August 4, 1914, closing in on Liege, which lies astride the Meuse River near the eastern boundary of Belgium. The fortifications of Liege had been constructed by Brialmont, a Belgian officer, who also designed the fortifications of Namur and Antwerp. They were completed in 1892, and consisted of a circle of forts commanding the main approaches to the city and about 4 miles therefrom. There were six main forts of the pentagonal type and six smaller, triangular in shape; the greatest distance between forts was 7,000 yards, and the average less than 4,000 yards. Each fort had a garrison of about 80 men and an armament of two 6-inch guns, four 4.7-inch guns, two 8-inch mortars, and three or four quick-fire guns, the total number of guns in the 12 forts being about 400. It was intended to construct

between the forts lines of trenches and redoubts for infantry and gun pits for artillery, but this had not been done.

The fort itself consisted of a low mound of concrete or masonry, roofed with concrete and covered with earth; a deep ditch surrounded the mound, the top of the latter barely showing above the margin of the ditch. The top was pierced with circular pits, in which "cupolas" or gun turrets moved up and down. Within the mound there were quarters, machinery, stores, etc.

When the Germans appeared the Belgian mobilization was still in progress, and it is probable that the garrison, instead of being 30,000 as was intended, was only 20,000. The Germans, numbering about 30,000, concentrated the attack on the four forts at the southeast sector and opened up with field guns on the night of August 4-5. One of the forts was silenced by this fire on the 5th, and on the 6th the Germans brought up their 8.4-inch howitzers and probably some 11-inch mortars, outranging the Belgian guns. Shells are said to have gone through 12 feet of concrete. The accurate firing of the Germans showed that the forts could not long withstand, and in the afternoon of the 6th the Belgian field force was withdrawn from the city and all the forts abandoned except the northern ones. The Germans left the remaining forts in peace until the 13th, when the 11-inch mortars opened on them, and by the 15th all had been captured. The cupolas had been smashed and shells had penetrated the roofs and exploded the magazines.

#### FORTIFICATIONS OF NAMUR AND ALONG THE FRENCH FRONTIER.

Namur was defended by a ring of nine forts,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles from the city, with an armament similar to that in the Liege forts. The garrison of 26,000 had prepared the defense of the intervals by intrenchments and wire entanglements, and a vigorous defense was intended, as French help was expected. The Germans brought up 32 modern siege pieces, including the 42-centimeter howitzer, its first appearance, and the Austrian 12-inch mortar, and placed them 3 miles from the Belgian lines. The attack began August 20. On the next day the Belgians had to withdraw from the advanced trenches owing to their inability to reply to the German fire; two forts fell; three others were silenced after an attack of two hours. On the 23d Namur was occupied, and on the 25th the last fort had fallen. One fort had fired only 10 times and was itself struck by 1,200 shells fired at the rate of 20 per minute. The speedy fall of Namur came near playing havoc with the allies' plans, as with the delay caused by its resistance they had intended to complete the concentration along the Belgian frontier.

Other fortified places, such as Lille, Laon, La Fere, and Rheims, along the northeastern French boundary fell before the advancing Germans without striking a blow. The advance was on such a broad front that an attempt at defense would have endangered the safety of the garrisons, and it was imperative that the garrisons join the field army. By August 28 Mauberge of all the northern strongholds alone held out. The defenses had been brought to a high state of efficiency, the intervals well prepared with an armored train running on a track encircling the main line of defenses. The German infantry invested the place August 27, but the siege guns did not go into action until September 3. The place fell September 8 with a loss of 40,000 men.

#### ANTWERP.

Antwerp, said to be the second most strongly fortified city of Europe, encircled by a girdle of 20 permanent forts and 12 earthen redoubts, was in similar manner quickly reduced by the heavy siege guns. The garrison, beginning to profit by the lessons learned at Liege and Namur, attempted to keep the enemy's big howitzers beyond range of the forts, but were driven back by the superior numbers of the Germans, whose siege guns were then brought up and quickly demolished the masonry forts. Thus the garrison was deprived of any further assistance from its larger guns and, being but poorly entrenched and unable to withstand the overwhelming artillery fire, was forced back to the inner line, thereby permitting the siege guns to come within range of the city, which had therefore to be abandoned promptly in order to prevent its destruction by bombardment.

#### VERDUN.

Verdun, however, on the eastern French frontier, with a ring of forts 5 miles from the city, is still in the hands of the French, because with a field army employing earthworks the fortified zone has been largely extended and the German howitzers have been kept 6 miles from the forts. The unfortified city of Nancy has withstood several heavy attacks, being protected by a field army on the hills forming the "Grand Crown."

#### PRZEMYSL AND THE RUSSIAN FORTIFICATIONS.

The Russians invested the fortress of Przemyśl on September 22, 1914, but later the siege was raised and on November 12 it was invested a second time. As the Russians had no heavy siege guns, the siege resulted in an attempt to starve out the garrison, which suc-



ceeded March 22, 1915. With the return of the Teutonic allies in May, 20 days was sufficient to recapture the place. The Russians stated that their ammunition supply was low, but it is safe to assume that the presence of the heavy siege guns with the Germans had a great deal to do with the recapture.

The fortresses guarding Warsaw and the Russian frontier on the west were quickly taken during the advance of the Teutonic allies in the summer of 1915, either by maneuvering the defenders out of them or by bringing up the heavy guns and shattering the fortifications, as at Novo Georgievsk. The fortress of Ossowetz on the line Niemen-Bohr-Narew had a different history. In February, 1915, the Russians fell back across the Bohr River to the protection of Ossowetz, which stood on the east bank along a long ridge covered with woods, affording good artillery positions, and commanding the opposite bank, where artillery positions were poor. There were extensive marshes along the river, but at this time of the year they were frozen. The Germans at first tried to turn the position, but failing, brought up their heavy mortars, even the 42-centimeter howitzer. The Russian batteries were so well concealed that the Germans could not locate them and their big guns did no damage. The Russians silenced several batteries without suffering from their fire. As the warm weather advanced, the marshes made it difficult to emplace the heavy guns. Ossowetz did not fall until August 22 in the general Russian retreat after the capture of Warsaw.

#### THE FORTIFIED CITY OF THE FUTURE.

The failure of the forts in the present war is due to several causes:

First. Being built some years before the war, their position was accurately known to the enemy, thus losing the advantage of concealment; also, the details of their construction leaked out and guns were especially designed to destroy them.

Second. Their armament had not been kept up to date and was entirely overpowered by guns of recent construction and of a type unknown to the defense.

Third. The garrisons permitted the enemy to emplace his guns within their effective range, but beyond range of the forts' guns.

The favorable effect of concealment, as a defensive measure, is illustrated by the operations against Ossowetz, and that of keeping the enemy at a distance by the operations against Verdun.

The experiences of this war confirm the conclusion reached during the siege of Port Arthur in 1904, "that the mounting of large-caliber guns in a fort for use against the siege guns of the enemy is a fatal

error." It would therefore seem preferable to place the fixed heavy guns in emplacements located in rear of the line of forts, depending for protection upon concealment rather than masonry or other cover. The forts themselves, whether permanent or improvised after the outbreak of war, should be designed for an infantry garrison only, and the main line of defense should consist of a continuous system of infantry entrenchments (including machine-gun emplacements), located in advance of the line of forts. These latter would serve mainly as supporting points for organizing a counter attack in case the front were penetrated.

To check the enemy's advance before his heaviest guns have reached points within effective range of the city, naval base, or other vital object to be protected, a garrison sufficiently strong to operate well in advance of the forts, is indispensable, and its action should be assisted by long-range fire from the fixed armament, which should be superior in caliber and range to the guns usually supplied to an army in the field.

The guns of the fortress, both fixed and mobile, should be distributed over a large area and advantage taken of the terrain to secure concealment, which must be had at any price. It is important to bear in mind that the number of guns permanently emplaced should be comparatively small compared with the total heavy armament of the fortress, or, in other words, the main reliance will be placed on the mobile guns, some of which should be at least as powerful as any the enemy can bring against them.

The fortress of the future should consist of a large area so organized as to insure extreme mobility both to troops and guns. There will be no conspicuous forts of masonry and armor. Permanent gun emplacements should be constructed only at important points with the primary intention of compelling the enemy to lose time in bringing up his heaviest siege guns. The mobile guns would be located in earthen emplacements well concealed from the enemy's observers who might endeavor to direct fire on them. The point to be emphasized is that unless the garrison be strong enough in both mobile troops and mobile guns to keep the enemy from breaking through the line or coming within effective range of the city proper or other vital point or object to be protected, then there is no hope of offering a prolonged resistance.

In view of the foregoing it is apparent that intrenched areas with mobile troops and guns are a more dependable protection than a stereotyped system of permanent forts.

## 2. INFLUENCE OF SEACOAST FORTIFICATIONS, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE ATTACK BY ALLIED FLEET ON DARDANELLES FORTIFICATIONS.

### DESCRIPTION OF THE DARDANELLES.

The western approach to the city of Constantinople from the Aegean Sea is through the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora. The Dardanelles (ancient Hellespont) is a long winding channel, 47 miles in length, but the really narrow portion, extending from the Aegean Sea to the town of Gallipoli, represents a sea passage of about 33 miles. The passage is at no point wider than 7,000 yards, and at one point, the Narrows, 14 miles from the entrance, it contracts to 1,400 yards. The surface current flows westward into the Aegean at an average speed of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  knots, which is sometimes trebled in the Narrows after strong northerly winds. The depth in mid-channel varies from 25 to 55 fathoms, and there are shallows at some of the bays in the wider sections. Owing to the narrowness, the strong current, and the cross currents set up at some of the bays, maneuvering of large vessels is difficult. The weather is treacherous and uncertain; the prevailing winds for nine months of the year are northeasterly, but south winds spring up quickly, and blows last from three to five days. Unfavorable weather and frequent haze and mist were encountered during the earlier stages of the naval operations.

The long narrow tongue of land to the north is the Gallipoli Peninsula. It has its greatest width, 12 miles, just above the Narrows or opposite Suvla Bay; it is narrowest at Bulair, 3 miles; at the Narrows the width is 5 miles. Ships can therefore lie in the Gulf of Saros and fire across the peninsula. The Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles is lower than the European. The hills are low and wooded, while on the peninsula they are bare and rocky cliffs. On both shores there are heights which give advantage to defensive artillery and at the Narrows both shores tower above the ships.

### FORTIFICATIONS OF THE DARDANELLES.

The original fortifications were the "Dardanelles Castles"; the two inner, the "Old Castles," at the Narrows, were built by the Sultan Mohammed II, the conqueror of Constantinople, in 1462; the two at the entrance, the "New Castles," were built in 1659. At the instigation of Great Britain new fortifications were built in the Narrows between 1864 and 1877. After the peace of San Stefano in 1878 the Germans designed new fortifications and all the new fortifications were armed with Krupp guns.



From the best obtainable information, in the spring of 1915 the armament was as follows: At the entrance between the towns of Seddel-Bahr near Cape Helles on the European side, and Kum Kale on the Asiatic side, there were four forts or batteries, two on each side, with an armament of ten 10.2-inch guns, four 9.2-inch guns, and two 6-inch guns.

Proceeding towards the Narrows, there were on the Asiatic side fortifications on Dardanes Hill, 4 miles south of the Narrows, and two forts at the Narrows near the town of Chanak—the whole mounting an armament of four 14-inch guns, six 10.2-inch guns, one 8.3-inch howitzer, and nine 6-inch guns. On the European side there were three batteries south of the town of Kilid Bahr at the Narrows, and a number of batteries on the hills around Kilid Bahr, the total armament being four 14-inch guns, one 11-inch gun, eight 10.2-inch guns, fourteen 9.2-inch guns, fifteen 8.3-inch howitzers, and twenty-four 6-inch guns. The armament between the entrance and the Narrows thus amounted to eight 14-inch guns, one 11-inch gun, fourteen 10.2-inch guns, fourteen 9.2-inch guns, fourteen 8.3-inch howitzers, and thirty-three 6-inch guns.

The fortifications extended 4 miles farther north to the line through Nagara, beyond which the Dardanelles turns to the north-east and broadens out. The armament on both sides amounted to two 14-inch guns, five 10.2-inch guns, five 9.2-inch guns, eight 8.3-inch howitzers, and fifteen 6-inch guns, all except six 6-inch guns being on the Asiatic side.

In addition to the above there were smaller guns to protect mine fields.

From an examination of the chart, it seems that a hostile fleet, after silencing the guns at the entrance and proceeding towards the Narrows, would be subject to the fire of the following guns when it had reached a point 4 miles from the Narrows: ten 14-inch guns, eighteen 10.2-inch guns, eight 9.2-inch guns, twenty-one 8.3-inch howitzers, and thirty-seven 6-inch guns.

(a) Power of the guns:

The guns in the batteries vary greatly; alongside old guns are guns of very great power. The heaviest gun, of which there were 10, the 14-inch Krupp, with a projectile weighing 1,365 pounds, appears superior to our 14-inch seacoast gun with its 1,600-pound projectile, as it has a reported penetration in Krupp hardened steel armor at 8,000 meters of 20 inches, while our gun has 16.3 inches. Its life, however, is limited to 80 or 90 rounds, and hence it is probably not as accurate as ours after firing a number of shots.

The next heaviest gun is the 11-inch, but there was only one of that caliber. Then comes the 10.2-inch, of which there were 29, a

gun manufactured some years ago by the Krupps. It is not as powerful as our 10-inch gun; its projectile weighs 450 pounds, as against our 575 pounds, and its penetration at 3,000 meters is 6 inches, while our gun penetrates 9.3 inches at 8,000 meters. The other heavy-caliber gun is 9.2 inches, of which there were 25, with a projectile weighing 420 pounds, and still more inferior to our 10-inch gun.

It is believed that Krupp guns of later pattern were mounted after the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, and it seems to be certain that heavy mobile howitzers or mortars were used against the allies.

(b) Character of the batteries:

The batteries were built with great care, but groups were formed of different calibers and types, which rendered serving them difficult and slow in action. The emplacements are of concrete and steel with earthen cover, with guns in embrasures rather than in turrets. There was a modern system of searchlights, telephones, and range finders, and good communication by roads. They were generally invisible from the sea, but their positions were detected by the stone barracks, which were usually close behind them and in full view of passing ships.

One of the batteries was manned entirely by Germans, but the others had Turkish crews that had been drilled by German officers. The movable howitzer batteries appeared to have had German coast artillerymen with German naval officers in command.

#### REDUCTION OF THE FORTS AT THE ENTRANCE.

On November 3, 1914, the allied fleet bombarded the forts at the entrance, but the real operations began February 19, 1915, with a fleet of British battleships and cruisers, aided by a strong French squadron. The attack was at first at long range, to which the forts could not reply, being outranged. In the afternoon the ships closed in and opened fire with the secondary batteries; the forts returned the fire. The forts on the European side were apparently silenced; one on the Asiatic side continued firing. The damage was subsequently found to be comparatively small and many of the guns were still intact. Eight battleships were engaged with a total of 46 guns of major caliber, 30 being 12-inch, and 58 guns of minor caliber from 7.5-inch to 4-inch. The shore guns were ten 10.2-inch, six 9.2-inch, and two 6-inch. No ship was hit. In general the guns were mounted in open works near the old masonry castles, with the sea faces protected by earth.

Action against these forts continued until February 25, when the reduction of all four was completed. In the meantime the new battleship, the *Queen Elizabeth*, with eight 15-inch guns and twelve 6-inch guns, had arrived, giving the allies 16 armored ships of

the line, 12 British and 4 French. The British casualties had been three killed and five wounded. Landing parties had been sent ashore as quickly as possible to complete the work of destruction, but were driven back by the Turks before completing the job. It was reported by the British that all forts were completely demolished with the exception of one at Kum Kale.

#### OPERATIONS AGAINST THE FORTS AT THE NARROWS.

Sweeping operations to clear the channel of mines and obstructions began February 25, and on March 1 three ships entered the strait and attacked Fort Dardanes with its five 6-inch guns in rectangular turrets on the military crest of a hill 350 feet high; these were said to be the only Turkish guns with telescopic sights. Sweeping operations and the attack on Fort Dardanes with its outlying smaller batteries continued until March 5, the French division and the *Queen Elizabeth* using indirect fire from the Gulf of Saros on the forts at Kilid Bahr at the Narrows. An aeroplane ship with sea planes and aeroplanes accompanied the fleet. But not a shot hit the forts during the indirect bombardment; according to the Turks, the aeroplanes did not remain long enough in the air to direct the fire. On March 8 the *Queen Elizabeth* entered the strait and fired on Kilid Bahr at 21,000 yards range. This long-range bombardment of the forts at the Narrows and closer action by the other ships against the batteries south of the Narrows, together with mine sweeping, continued until March 18. The ships were hit several times, including the *Queen Elizabeth*, which was struck by field guns, but no material damage was done and the casualties were slight. Fort Dardanes and other concealed batteries near by were almost daily under the fire of from four or five ships, sixteen 12-inch guns and forty-eight 6-inch guns being used against five 6-inch guns. No battery on the Turkish side was put permanently out of action. The Turkish casualties, omitting those in the forts at the entrance, which were heavy, were 23 killed and 10 wounded.

#### FINAL ATTACK OF MARCH 18.

On March 18 there was a general attack on the Narrows, participated in by 12 British and 4 French ships, mounting a total of 82 major caliber guns from 15-inch to 9.2-inch, and 178 minor caliber guns from 7.5-inch to 4-inch. As stated in paragraph 2, subparagraph 2, "Fortifications of the Dardanelles," pages 4 and 5, the number of guns that the Turks could bring into action against this fleet was 36 major caliber direct-fire guns and 21 howitzers, a total of 57, and 37 minor caliber guns. In addition there were fieldpieces



and movable heavy howitzers, the number being indeterminate. In the forenoon the *Queen Elizabeth*, just inside the entrance, 10½ miles from the Narrows, and three older British ships bombarded the forts at the Narrows, while two other British ships at closer range attacked Dardanes and the batteries south of the Narrows. Shortly after noon the French division of four ships advanced to the support of these two ships, taking up a position near Kephez Point, 3 miles south of the Narrows. A heavy fire was now returned by the forts, but as the ships were maneuvering in circles, few hits were made. The 10 ships that were engaged at this time mounted 58 major caliber guns. At 1.25 p. m. the forts ceased firing. A fresh British squadron of six ships now arrived to relieve a corresponding number of ships well within the strait. As this squadron neared Kephez Point, the other ships turned to withdraw when the French ship, *Bouvet*, was struck several times and blew up, the cause of the explosion probably being a drifting mine. The new squadron continued the advance, attacking in line; the ships just within the entrance continued the bombardment, but it was manifest that the forts had not been silenced. Mine sweeping operations continued, but drifting mines sunk the British ships *Irresistible* and *Ocean*, and a mine and gunfire so badly damaged the *Inflexible* that it with difficulty reached the harbor of Mudros, 40 miles away. The French ship *Gaulois* was also badly damaged by gunfire. The attack ceased when darkness fell.

The attack had been badly repulsed and was not again renewed. The British casualties were slight, 61 all told, practically all the crew from the *Irresistible* and *Ocean* being saved; but the French lost nearly the entire crew of the *Bouvet*. The Turks lost 23 killed and 60 wounded. The 6-inch guns in the turrets at Dardanes, which had received such a heavy fire, were not damaged; the turrets were hit only three times. On the European side three 10-inch guns were put out of action, but three weeks later all were ready again. The stone barracks in rear of the batteries were destroyed; 86 shells fell in a space 300 feet deep in rear of one battery, but the battery was untouched. The shells easily penetrated earth, but not one passed through sand parapets. After March 18, the Turks substituted sand for earth to a large degree in the parapets and divided up the large interior rooms of the batteries into smaller ones by hollow walls filled with sand.

#### EFFICIENCY OF SEACOAST FORTIFICATIONS.

The operations in the Dardanelles have been the only instance in this war of a naval attack on seacoast fortifications, except the minor attack of the Japanese Navy against the German fortifications at Tsingtau. Elsewhere, by virtue of their existence, they have per-

formed their functions of protecting harbors, fleets, and naval bases. The German fleet, under the protection of the shore guns, has maintained its existence in spite of the proximity of the superior British fleet.

These operations have emphasized the fact that has been thoroughly demonstrated by history that a purely naval attack can not succeed against seacoast fortifications adequately armed and manned, and that in such actions the proper function of the navy is to convoy the army, which will make the attack by land, and to protect its line of communications.

#### REQUISITES FOR SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE.

The forts at the entrance fell and those in the Narrows were scarcely damaged, though in both cases there was an overwhelming fire from the ships. The difference in the two cases is this: At the entrance the guns were outranged and the ships had plenty of sea room in which to maneuver and bring the heavy guns to bear, free from danger of mines; in the narrow mined channel of the Narrows, with both shores lined with guns, some of them equal or nearly so to the heaviest ship gun, the ships had to come within range and could attack with only a portion of the force. In such a position, a fleet, exposed to fixed and floating mines, shore torpedoes and submarines, will fail. The slight damage sustained by the shore batteries is illustrated by Fort Dardanes, which withstood the fire from the British ships, admittedly inferior to none in marksmanship. An interior city, with its approach channel protected with well-placed and concealed guns, equal in range to the enemy's, and provided with the accessory means of defense, need not fear capture by bombardment or a run by the forts. A fort on the seacoast proper, exposed to the fire from ships at sea, must have guns of greater range than the ships' guns; otherwise the ships could silence the guns on shore at their pleasure, and under their fire could land troops to complete the destruction of the forts.

Concealment and dispersion are also necessary. The aeroplane observation of fire by the allies does not seem to have been very efficient, but this can not always be relied on, and concealment from aerial observation should be obtained. Without such observation, long-range indirect bombardment is worthless. By taking advantage of the terrain and resorting to dispersion, the amount of concrete might be reduced, and the money thus saved put into more guns.

#### NECESSITY FOR MOBILE TROOPS.

The power of coast fortifications, to repel a direct attack by an enemy fleet, is limited to the area within range of their guns, but their influence is extended considerably further whenever they cover

a base from which submarines operate. These fortifications must therefore be recognized as of supreme importance within the scope of their proper functions, and this is especially true of a country possessing an enormous frontage on two oceans. Their paramount value is that they relieve the navy of the local defense of important harbors or other strategic points and thus release our seagoing fleet for operations against the enemy on the high seas, and furnish a refuge for it in the face of overpowering odds. But beyond the sphere of influence of our seacoast forts, enemy ships may approach the shore with impunity and, under the cover of their guns, may land troops that can then proceed against the important places defended by the forts or even against the forts themselves, since they are vulnerable from the land side. With our long coast lines, the guarding of every possible landing place by seacoast fortifications is out of the question, and, although the development and employment of heavy mobile seacoast armament along our coastal railroads will further restrict the landing places open to an enemy, there will still remain many places affording facilities for landing operations which can only be opposed by mobile troops acting without the cooperation of Coast Artillery. For these reasons it is evident that there must also be available a mobile force properly trained, organized and equipped, to send against the enemy at the landing and defeat them there, or at least prevent his advance toward his objective, should a landing be effected. Until we have adequately provided for this dual defense of our coasts, having full regard to both fixed defenses and mobile troops, our Navy will never be free to perform its primary function, but will be frittered away in response to clamor for protection from our coast population.

An illustration of the value of mobile troops in coast defense is afforded by the operations at the Dardanelles, described in the last subhead under paragraph 3, page 12, of this study.

### 3. SUMMARY OF ATTEMPT TO TAKE DARDANELLES FORTIFICATIONS BY MOBILE TROOPS.

#### INITIAL DELAY.

Before the attack of March 18 it had been decided to undertake operations by land at the Dardanelles. An official French note stated on the 12th that a force was on its way to the Levant, and Gen. Iam Hamilton was appointed commander of the British force and arrived in time to witness the action of the 18th. Both the French and British forces had arrived in the harbor of Mudros on the island of Lemnos, west of the Dardanelles; but as the British transports had not been loaded with a view to make a landing in force on a hostile shore and the lack of facilities in Mudros made



redistribution impossible there, they had to be sent back to Alexandria for reloading. A month was lost, which it is safe to say was well employed by the Turks.

#### TERRAIN.

The Gallipoli Peninsula is covered by hills which rise to a height of 1,000 feet; on the southern end Achi Baba, 600 feet high, dominates the end of the peninsula; just west of the Narrows, Kilid Bahr, 700 feet high, covers the forts from an attack from the Aegean; and northwest of the Narrows, Sari Bair Mountain reaches a height of 970 feet. These hills must be taken before an advance can be made to the shores of the Narrows. The hills do not run in a regular or well-defined direction, and between the hills there are a confusing number of valleys. The area is practically roadless and most of it covered with prickly scrub. The sides of the hills are almost vertical. At the water's edge there is generally a narrow beach with a steep bank 10 feet high, and then the rolling hills with their crests 1,000 yards from the beach. Every trail leading to the beach was covered with one or more machine guns in screened pits, and the roads were covered with field guns in groups of from three to six.

#### STRENGTH OF FORCES.

The British force consisted of the Twenty-ninth (Regular) Division, the East Lancashire (Territorial) Division, a naval division of bluejackets and marines, some Indian troops, and the Australian and New Zealand Corps, with 20 battalions of infantry, together with artillery and engineers. The strength was approximately 100,000. The territorials and colonial troops had been wintering in Egypt. The French force was about 35,000. The Turks were in greater force and better posted than was expected; the number on the European side has been given as over 150,000. Besides, they were supported by the Germans.

#### ALLIES' PLAN.

The coast being precipitous, landing places few, and trenches and entanglements being visible on shipboard at most of them, Gen. Hamilton decided to throw the whole of his troops very rapidly ashore at a number of places, and selected five beaches at the tip of the peninsula and two on the west coast, near Sari Bair Mountain, as landing places. He could thus advance up the peninsula or cross it where it was about five miles wide, and obtaining possession of the high hills, secure observation points whereby the navy could assist in the reduction of the forts.



## LANDINGS AT SOUTH END OF PENINSULA.

April 25 was the date of the landing. The Twenty-ninth Division, 20,000 men, was to land at the end of the peninsula at the five beaches, the three at the tip, near Sedd-el-Bahr, being the main ones. At the other two places, the landing was to take place at dawn, while at the main places the landings were to be simultaneously at 5.30 a. m., after half an hour's bombardment by the fleet. The landing parties, covering the advance of the division, were placed on naval vessels the previous day and before dawn on the 25th were in the small boats in which they were to be towed ashore. The accompanying squadron of four battleships and four cruisers began the preliminary bombardment. At S beach, in Morto Bay, the farthest to the east, three companies (750 men) made a successful landing, with a loss of 50 men, and kept the position. On Y beach, the westernmost landing, two battalions (2,000 men) landed on an undefended beach, but were subsequently attacked and driven to the boats with heavy losses. On X beach, 3 miles south of Y beach, 1 battalion (1,000 men) made a successful landing, under cover of the fire of the *Implacable*, which stood close inshore, firing with every possible gun, thus preparing the way for a subsequent force of 2,000 men, which joined hands with the force landing at W beach, the next to the south. On W beach, 1 battalion (1,000 men) landed on a beach 350 yards long and 15 to 40 yards wide, well protected with intrenchments and entanglements, the latter extending under water. The Turks reserved their fire until the first boatload of soldiers grounded, and under this fire the assailants had to make their way through the entanglement. A foothold was gained and, more infantry following, connection was made with X beach. At V beach, west of Sedd-el-Bahr, the site of the seacoast forts that had previously been reduced by the navy, a force of about 3,000 attempted to land on a beach 350 yards long by 10 yards wide, overlooked by a natural amphitheater rising back from the beach, with concave slopes. On the very margin of the beach ran a wire entanglement and up the slopes were two other lines, the whole covered with fire of rifles, machine guns, and pom-poms. Three companies (750 men), landing in small boats, were almost annihilated, the survivors obtaining shelter under the lee of a low sandy bank 4 feet high, at the inner edge of the beach; the boat crews were all killed. It was intended to land 2,000 men from a collier, the *Clyde*, which was to be run ashore, and lighters used to form a gangway between ship and shore. The attempt failed; of 1,000 men who left the colliers, 50 per cent were kill or wounded. Nothing could be done until night, when the remainder of the infantry from the *Clyde* went ashore. On the 26th, under cover of the fire from the

ships, the troops established themselves on the crests of the surrounding hills. During the night of the 25th, the disembarkation of the remainder of the Twenty-ninth Division was proceeding on W and X beaches.

#### LANDING BY THE AUSTRALIAN-NEW ZEALAND CORPS.

This corps of 35,000 men landed north of Gaba Tepe, near the foot of Sari Bair Mountain. This rugged and difficult part of the coast was chosen because it was believed it would be undefended. The landing was to be a surprise and the preliminary bombardment was omitted. The covering force of 4,000 men in ships' boats was towed by destroyers to within 500 yards from the beach, which was 1,000 yards long, when the destroyers dropped behind and steam launches towed the boats in. In the darkness the boats were close to the shore before they were discovered. About a battalion of Turks disputed the landing, but they were driven back. The main body came up in the transports and by 2 p. m. 12,000 men and two batteries of mountain artillery were ashore. The Turks promptly rallied and reinforced to 20,000 by 11 a. m., made counter attacks. These counter attacks continued for several days, but with the assistance of the ships' fire the British maintained their position. On this first day—April 25—29,000 men were landed.

#### DIVERSION BY THE FRENCH.

As a diversion to draw the fire of the Asiatic guns from Sedd-el-Bahr, a regiment of the French corps landed at Kum Kale on the Asiatic shore on the 25th, but on the 26th they reembarked, after a loss of 754, one-fourth of its effective strength, and the French corps began landing at V Beach.

#### ATTEMPTS TO ADVANCE.

On April 28 the allies held a line across the peninsula, three miles north of Sedd-el-Bahr, and an attempt was made to capture the hill of Achi Baba, which failed. The troops landing on the west coast also tried to advance, but were held to a semicircle 1,100 yards in diameter from the beach. Here they were holding open a door to the vital point of the Turkish position and were keeping 24,000 of the best Turkish troops out of the main action around Sedd-el-Bahr. By May 5 the landing of the allies was completed. The British official report gives the losses among the British at this time as 602 officers and 13,377 men, which is about 13.5 per cent of the total estimated force of 100,000. It is estimated that the Turks lost 18,000 in the operations of April 25-27.

May 5 a general advance was attempted against the town of Krithia and the hill of Achi Baba, but the attack was unsuccessful. May 18 the Turks, estimated at 30,000, attacked the force at Anzac Cove (the name given to the landing place of the Australian-New Zealand Corps, themselves termed "Anzacs"), and were repulsed with a loss of 7,000, the Anzacs losing 500. To May 31 the British losses were 38,636 (1,722 being officers), the French about 5,000, and the Turkish estimated at 60,000. The total battle losses of the British in the three years of the Boer War were 38,156. According to a Turkish report at this date the number of British and French troops amounted to 90,000. The Turks had received 60,000 reinforcements.

June 4 there was another general attack by the allies from Sedd-el-Bahr; on the right there were two French divisions, the rest of the line, 4,000 yards, being held by 24,000 British infantry. The net result was a gain of 200 to 400 yards along a front of three miles. The line then held extended from south of Krithia southeast across the peninsula, about 4 miles from Sedd-el-Bahr. The appearance of German submarines caused the withdrawal to Mudros Harbor of the transports and the sending of supplies in small boats. The Turks under Enver Pasha made a general attack in the vicinity of Krithia June 30-July 2, but accomplished little, with a loss of 5,150 killed and 15,000 wounded. To July 18, the British losses were 49,283, 2,144 being officers.

#### LANDING AT SUVLA BAY AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS.

August 7 another landing was made at Suvla Bay, 4 miles north of Anzac Cove. The landing began at 2 a. m. on three beaches and by day a force of two divisions was firmly established. The Anzac force joined in the attack, the intention being to connect the two forces and capture the Sari Bair Ridge. The attack from Anzac was carried to the summit of the ridge, but as the Turks had been heavily reenforced, the attack from Suvla Bay did not make the expected progress, and the line had to fall back. The two forces were finally joined on a line 12 miles long. The number of men landing at Suvla Bay is not known; the British speak of it as a fresh army and the Turks estimated it as 70,000. The British losses were heavy; according to the Turks, 30,000.

According to a German estimate, on August 30 the allies had from 20,000 to 25,000 troops at Sedd-el-Bahr, of whom 9,000 were French, all that was left of the original 35,000; 9,000 at Anzac Cove, and 70,000 at Suvla Bay. These numbers were not materially increased after that date, though the losses in the trench warfare since then had brought the casualties on November 9 to 106,610 among the British. The Turkish losses are unknown. On December 20 it was



announced that the troops at Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove, about 100,000, had been withdrawn from the peninsula for service elsewhere; the troops at Sedd-el-Bahr were left there until January 9, 1916, when they, too, were withdrawn.

#### NECESSITY FOR HEAVY MOBILE GUNS.

Although the Turks had ample warning of the impending attack, with an abundance of men to draw upon, and had guarded the most probable landing places with intrenchments and entanglements, the allies succeeded in getting ashore. With the limited number of beaches suitable for landing, the Turks apparently had sufficient force to guard every one; but some were overlooked and the success of the allies is due partly to that fact. The main reason for the success, though, is due to the fire of the covering ships, which could come in close enough to use all their guns and thus keep down the fire of the Turks. If the Turks had employed guns heavy enough to stand the ships off, the landing would not have taken place, for experience has shown that even the most powerful naval guns at long range are unable to put well concealed shore guns out of action. Even chance hits have little effect upon the sand or earthen parapets.

It may be accepted then as a fact, that to prevent a hostile force from landing there must be in addition to the usual infantry defense at all the possible landings, guns of sufficient power to keep the naval vessels at such a distance that their secondary batteries can not be used. Thus the landing of troops or supplies from ships at so great a distance from the shore can readily be prevented by the infantry and field guns.

In the case of a landing on our coast, the stretch to be covered is so long that it is impracticable to implace in prepared positions enough of these guns to cover all the possible landing places. It will therefore be necessary to use mobile guns that can be quickly transported to the point threatened. The quickest method of transportation appears to be a railroad paralleling the beach, from which spurs could be run to points near enough to the front to keep ships at about 8,000 yards from the shore. The railroad, spur tracks, and gun locations should be prepared in time of peace.

#### THE VALUE OF MOBILE TROOPS IN COAST DEFENSE.

After the allies had succeeded in the landing operations and had assembled on the peninsula the entire expeditionary force, their further advance was small, and after maintaining a position near the water's edge for over nine months, the force was withdrawn. The reason for the failure appears to be threefold: First, the size of the

Turkish force was underestimated and an insufficient number of troops was sent at first, and these troops were not sufficiently reinforced; second, the terrain was favorable to the Turks; third, most important of all, the Turks had sufficient troops to prevent the allies from advancing.

Considering our own requirements, it should be noted that the terrain along our Atlantic Coast is not so favorable to the defense as that of the Gallipoli Peninsula, as the landing beaches are numerous and extensive and the ground in rear is generally favorable for an advance. Moreover, our coast is too extended to permit the preparation of defenses in advance at all possible landing places. There is consequently the more necessity for mobile troops.

With a well-trained and equipped force equal or superior to the force that had succeeded in landing, the operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula lead us to believe that an advance from the beach away from the cover of the ships, can be prevented; but without such a force, once the outer line of defense at the beach has been penetrated, the forces must be withdrawn to some thoroughly prepared position covering the objective of the enemy. Unless such a position of suitable extent has been prepared in advance, further resistance is hopeless.